Intergenerational Justice Review https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr <h3> </h3> en-US Intergenerational Justice Review 2190-6335 <p>Articles in IGJR are being published under the Creative-Commons License "CC 4.0 BY". On the basis of this license, the article may be edited and changed, but the author always has to be credited for the original work. By sending your article to IGJR, you agree to the publication of your article under this license. Please contact us if you do not want to have your article be published under CC 4.0 BY.</p> Table of Contents https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8705 IGJR-Editors Copyright (c) 2025 IGJR-Editors http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 10.24357/igjr.11.1.8705 Preventing a nuclear escalation in the Ukraine conflict https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8706 <p>The Russia-Ukraine conflict has rekindled global anxieties about the potential use of nuclear weapons. It has exposed the complexities of nuclear deterrence in a highly volatile security environment. As tensions have escalated, the risk of nuclear hostilities – whether tactical, demonstrative, or accidental – has become a major point of concern. The Russian administration has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons and announced an update of its nuclear doctrine in November 2024, thereby lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, in critically examining Russia’s nuclear doctrine, this article aims to identify the key triggers for escalation and evaluate the strategic responses of the international community. It investigates how NATO countries, supported by the US’s extended nuclear deterrence commitment, have maintained a calibrated approach, combining military assistance to Ukraine and a high level of nuclear readiness, to ensure a precarious balance that prevented a major nuclear escalation. Underscoring the relevance of nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine conflict, it further delineates how Russia employed nuclear sabre-rattling as a deterrent and an enabler to achieve its strategic goals. Likewise, assessing the impact of Donald Trump’s re-election and his ‘America First’ mantra on the Ukraine conflict, this article discusses potential ways to prevent the conflict from going nuclear, while reinforcing the significance of renewed multilateral cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and a unified Western resolve to deter Russian aggression.</p> Ayesha Zafar Copyright (c) 2025 Ayesha Zafar http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 10.24357/igjr.11.1.8706 Sustainable nuclear non-proliferation. Case-study: Iran https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8707 <p>Sustainable nuclear non-proliferation is only possible in a world without nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons, the odds are that nuclear proliferation will happen, despite the existence of a comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation regime. The next proliferator may be Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)(2015) – better known as the Iran deal – was a very good effort to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. In exchange for sanctions relief, Iran promised to restrict the size of its civilian nuclear program. President Trump withdrew from the Agreement in 2018. As a result, Iran is now very close to acquiring nuclear weapons. The bombings of Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel and the US in 2025 have only caused a delay. Knowledge cannot be bombed. It remains to be seen whether President Trump will succeed in signing an agreement with Iran in his second term.</p> Tom Sauer Copyright (c) 2025 Tom Sauer http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 10.24357/igjr.11.1.8707 Framing the Bomb: media representations, public perceptions and the future of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8708 <p>What is the public perception of nuclear weapons in the UK? And what is the role of the media in shaping this perception? This article examines these questions in the context of the ‘Third Nuclear Age’: a new era of multipolarity, increasing tensions, emerging technologies, and the collapse of longstanding arms control agreements. I begin by placing representations of, and attitudes towards, nuclear deterrence and disarmament within today’s broader political communication landscape. I then examine several illustrative examples of how nuclear weapons are represented in the UK, before examining recent British public opinion about nuclear weapons. I argue that the public understanding of nuclear weapons in the UK is not static or singular but shaped by dynamic, contested narratives that circulate through policy discourse, traditional and digital media, and popular culture. Drawing on framing theory, discourse analysis, and recent public opinion data, I examine how media representations as well as public perceptions and emotions shape what nuclear futures are imagined as possible for the UK in the Third Nuclear Age.</p> Rhys Crilley Copyright (c) 2025 Rhys Crilley http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 10.24357/igjr.11.1.8708 Editorial https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8704 Jörg Tremmel Grace Clover Copyright (c) 2025 Jörg Tremmel, Grace Clover http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 Marianne Takle: Showing social solidarity with future generations https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8709 Theresa Eisenmann Copyright (c) 2025 Theresa Eisenmann http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 10.24357/igjr.11.1.8709 Greg Bognar and Axel Gosseries (eds.): Ageing without ageism? Conceptual puzzles and policy proposals https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8710 Grace Clover Copyright (c) 2025 Grace Clover http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 2025-10-24 2025-10-24 11 1 10.24357/igjr.11.1.8710