https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/issue/feedIntergenerational Justice Review2025-10-24T08:09:36+00:00Jörg Tremmeleditors@srzg.deOpen Journal Systems<h3> </h3>https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8705Table of Contents2025-10-24T07:33:06+00:00IGJR-Editorseditors@srzg.de2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 IGJR-Editorshttps://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8706Preventing a nuclear escalation in the Ukraine conflict2025-10-24T07:35:42+00:00Ayesha Zafarayeshazafar100@hotmail.com<p>The Russia-Ukraine conflict has rekindled global anxieties about the potential use of nuclear weapons. It has exposed the complexities of nuclear deterrence in a highly volatile security environment. As tensions have escalated, the risk of nuclear hostilities – whether tactical, demonstrative, or accidental – has become a major point of concern. The Russian administration has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons and announced an update of its nuclear doctrine in November 2024, thereby lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, in critically examining Russia’s nuclear doctrine, this article aims to identify the key triggers for escalation and evaluate the strategic responses of the international community. It investigates how NATO countries, supported by the US’s extended nuclear deterrence commitment, have maintained a calibrated approach, combining military assistance to Ukraine and a high level of nuclear readiness, to ensure a precarious balance that prevented a major nuclear escalation. Underscoring the relevance of nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine conflict, it further delineates how Russia employed nuclear sabre-rattling as a deterrent and an enabler to achieve its strategic goals. Likewise, assessing the impact of Donald Trump’s re-election and his ‘America First’ mantra on the Ukraine conflict, this article discusses potential ways to prevent the conflict from going nuclear, while reinforcing the significance of renewed multilateral cooperation, diplomatic engagement, and a unified Western resolve to deter Russian aggression.</p>2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 Ayesha Zafarhttps://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8707Sustainable nuclear non-proliferation. Case-study: Iran2025-10-24T07:42:40+00:00Tom Sauertom.sauer@uantwerpen.be<p>Sustainable nuclear non-proliferation is only possible in a world without nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons, the odds are that nuclear proliferation will happen, despite the existence of a comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation regime. The next proliferator may be Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)(2015) – better known as the Iran deal – was a very good effort to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. In exchange for sanctions relief, Iran promised to restrict the size of its civilian nuclear program. President Trump withdrew from the Agreement in 2018. As a result, Iran is now very close to acquiring nuclear weapons. The bombings of Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel and the US in 2025 have only caused a delay. Knowledge cannot be bombed. It remains to be seen whether President Trump will succeed in signing an agreement with Iran in his second term.</p>2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 Tom Sauerhttps://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8708Framing the Bomb: media representations, public perceptions and the future of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom2025-10-24T07:47:48+00:00Rhys CrilleyRhys.Crilley@glasgow.ac.uk<p>What is the public perception of nuclear weapons in the UK? And what is the role of the media in shaping this perception? This article examines these questions in the context of the ‘Third Nuclear Age’: a new era of multipolarity, increasing tensions, emerging technologies, and the collapse of longstanding arms control agreements. I begin by placing representations of, and attitudes towards, nuclear deterrence and disarmament within today’s broader political communication landscape. I then examine several illustrative examples of how nuclear weapons are represented in the UK, before examining recent British public opinion about nuclear weapons. I argue that the public understanding of nuclear weapons in the UK is not static or singular but shaped by dynamic, contested narratives that circulate through policy discourse, traditional and digital media, and popular culture. Drawing on framing theory, discourse analysis, and recent public opinion data, I examine how media representations as well as public perceptions and emotions shape what nuclear futures are imagined as possible for the UK in the Third Nuclear Age.</p>2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 Rhys Crilleyhttps://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8704Editorial2025-10-24T07:26:01+00:00Jörg Tremmeljoerg.tremmel@uni-tuebingen.deGrace Clovergraceclover.gc@gmail.com2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 Jörg Tremmel, Grace Cloverhttps://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8709Marianne Takle: Showing social solidarity with future generations2025-10-24T07:52:06+00:00Theresa Eisenmanntheresaeisenmann2804@gmail.com2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 Theresa Eisenmannhttps://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/8710Greg Bognar and Axel Gosseries (eds.): Ageing without ageism? Conceptual puzzles and policy proposals2025-10-24T07:55:02+00:00Grace Clovergraceclover.gc@gmail.com2025-10-24T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2025 Grace Clover