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Age Groups and Generations: Lines of Conflict and Potentials for Integration

by Prof. Dr. Martin Kohli

Abstract: *At the beginning of the 21st century, the old 'social question' – the integration of the industrial workers – seems to have been resolved, but new cleavages appear, for example between generations. These emerge from historical or macro-structural changes but also from economic cleavages between generations. The reason why age conflicts are not more pronounced is the mediating function of political parties, unions and families. Furthermore, although it is often claimed that the welfare state is increasingly dominated by the elderly, this is far from being the case. In terms of economic well-being, both the young and the old fare worse than the middle age group. In terms of political decision-making, there is no evidence for an alleged movement towards gerontocracy.*

Introduction

The 'rush hour' of life may be regarded as a manifestation of cleavages between age groups or generations. Cleavages inherent in social structure create the potential for conflicts; whether and to what extent these conflicts manifest themselves openly depends on the mobilisation of the actors on both sides of the rift. However, there are also links which reach across the cleavages. In our societies marked by demographic discontinuity we heavily depend

on these links in order to maintain societal integration. They are created by a range of institutions, above all, political institutions such as parties and unions on the one hand and families on the other. The potential for generational integration is threatened, though, by the current changes in social structure and the welfare state. This chapter will treat both the cleavages and the potentials for their integration.

Old and new inequalities

The 'social question' dominating the end of the 19th century was the integration of the industrial workers, in other words, the pacification of class conflict. This was achieved by giving workers some assurance of a stable life course, including the institutionalisation of retirement as a normal stage of life funded through public social security.¹ At the beginning of the 21st century, class conflict seems to be defunct and its place taken over by generational conflict.² The new social question consists in maintaining a balanced generational contract, which should protect the elderly and invest in the young while being financially sustainable and socially just.³ This is due both to the success of the welfare state, which has created age-graded claims and obligations and turned the elderly into its main clients, and to the demographic

challenge of low fertility and increasing longevity.⁴

Are we thus moving from class conflict to generational conflict?⁵ Such an assertion needs to be qualified in two ways.⁶ First, it should be noted that conflict or competition between young and old over scarce resources is by no means new; it is a common theme in historical and anthropological accounts of pre-modern societies as well. But with the evolution of the modern welfare state the form and arena of this conflict have changed. Secondly, and more importantly for our present concerns, it remains

The family is changing, not disappearing. We have to broaden our understanding of it, look for the new metaphors.

/ Mary Catherine Bateson /

essential to assess the extent of the generational cleavage per se and the extent to which it masks the continued existence of the class cleavage between wealthy and poor (or owners and workers). There are moreover other cleavages that are usually categorised as 'new' dimensions of inequality (in distinction to the 'old' ones of class), such as those of gender and ethnicity (or 'race'). Emphasising the generational

conflict as the new basic cleavage in society tends to downplay other inequalities, and by this, risks being ideological: it may function as a way to divert attention from the still existing problems of poverty and exclusion within generations, e.g., those based on class or gender.⁷ Age is the foremost basis for public entitlements and obligations. Public redistribution over the life course has been one of the strongest elements of what I have called the institutionalisation of the life course as a sequence of clearly delimited periods of life, each with its own profile of social roles and positions, of cultural expectations, and of legal obligations and claims.⁸ As shown by life course profiles of benefits and contributions, the elderly have become the main clients of welfare state redistribution, mostly through pensions and health care. In terms of legitimacy and distributional justice redistribution among age groups is (relatively) unproblematic because we can expect everyone to live through the different stages of life. Unlike gender or ethnic groups, age groups do not have a fixed membership but a regularly changing one where all individuals progress through the life course from one stage to the next according to an institutionalised schedule.⁹ Thus, differential treatment of age groups is morally acceptable,¹⁰ and maybe justified by the different needs that age groups have, or by reasonable political goals.¹¹ The only problem here is posed by the fact that people do not all live equally long. This differential longevity is socially stratified, and thus constitutes a massive social inequality that is compounded by demographic aging. Generational redistribution, on the other hand, is inherently problematic. ‘Generation’ can be defined in terms of position in the family lineage or, at the societal level, in terms of being born in a certain time period and sharing the same historical experiences. Thus, societal generations have a fixed membership,¹² and there is no legitimisation for an unequal treatment of them – indiscriminately of the question of how far into the future (or into the past) the standard of equality should be extend-

ed. The intergenerational sharing of burdens and rewards is just or fair to the extent that each generation can expect to receive the same treatment as the preceding and following ones while moving through the stages of life. Financing the elderly during one’s professional life through a pay-as-you-go system is not problematic as long as one can expect to have one’s own retirement funded by the next generation as well.¹³ Unfortunately though, this is rarely the case; generational differences are the rule rather than the exception.

The impact of historical and macro-structural changes

The reason for this phenomenon is linked to the experience of historical watersheds such as wars or system changes. These have varied massively from country to country and were more numerous in some countries than in others. Switzerland is an example for a rather fortunate country which has had a less eventful recent history than others, and the U.S. is another such example with much more continuity than most European countries. Like most social science literature, the literature on generations is still to a large extent an American literature and therefore does not take into account what people across most of Europe have experienced in terms of historical discontinuity. The inclusion of a European perspective is therefore highly necessary.

As an illustration, here is some data on how Germans view the impact of historical events on their past lives.¹⁴ It is taken from the German Aging Survey of 1996, a nationally representative survey of the German population aged 40-85 and living in private households.¹⁵ The two major events in recent history for the respondents were World War II and the ‘turn’ (‘die Wende’), i.e., the demise of socialism and German reunification. Whereas West Germans attach more importance to World War II, in the East of the country the ‘turn’ has been the key event (cf. table 1). Other events or changes that are mentioned to some extent in the West, but almost by no one in the East, are the cul-

tural and political transformation of the 1960’s (“1968”) and the nuclear accident and fallout of Tchernobyl.

	West	East
World War I	0.7%	0.8%
World War II	55.1%	31.6%
‘Turn’ (unification)	30.0%	80.7%
Tchernobyl	5.6%	0.3%
‘1968’	4.1%	0.8%

Table 1: Historical watersheds in West and East Germany Answers to the question “This question concerns how people think about their past. There have been many events or changes in our country and in the world in this century. Please name one or two such events or changes that have left a special imprint on your life” Own calculations based on the German Aging Survey 1996

The economics of demographic discontinuity

Cultural shifts such as those of the 1960’s as well as changes in institutionalised life course patterns leading to age-graded experiences, obligations and entitlements are other factors that create generational cleavages. Richard Easterlin (1980) has offered a poignant analysis of

If men were angels, no government would be necessary.

/ James Madison /

economic cleavages among generations based on the demographic discontinuity of baby boom and baby bust. His argument is that large birth cohorts face more competition in schools, labour and marriage markets and will thus remain relatively disadvantaged over their life course. As a consequence, they also produce fewer children; for these smaller birth cohorts, the opposite holds, so that they will have more children again. The argument has not been corroborated in countries other than the U.S., but is an important reminder of how demographic and economic fortunes may interact with each other to produce different cohorts. David Thomson¹⁶ has treated the welfare state as a generational conspiracy. He tried to show for New Zealand that there was one generation which played the system so well that it reaped all the advantages while both those living earlier and those living later had to pay for it. This generation first created a youth-state with housing subsidies and benefits for young families and then, over its own life course, turned it into a welfare state for the elderly.¹⁷ This is a challenging assertion which, however, has not found support from other countries so far.



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Country	Year	Age 0 - 17	Age 18 - 25	Age 26 - 40	Age 41 - 50	Age 51 - 65	Age 66 - 75	Age 76+
Australia	1999	87.6	120.4	108.6	122.0	92.0	67.0	63.5
France	2000	93.4	98.2	99.7	111.6	114.6	88.5	86.4
Germany	2001	90.0	95.8	100.2	113.1	112.0	88.8	83.8
Hungary	2000	92.9	109.2	105.7	109.2	107.8	80.3	82.3
Italy	2000	89.1	101.8	105.6	105.3	112.8	86.2	77.2
Japan	2000	90.6	104.3	98.5	109.2	113.0	90.6	88.8
Sweden	2000	98.3	91.7	99.1	111.8	125.3	88.3	68.6
Switzerland	2001	85.5	109.2	101.2	109.5	114.5	91.0	78.2
United Kingdom	2000	88.4	106.2	108.0	121.3	108.5	77.2	71.0
United States	2000	86.7	93.6	103.5	113.9	121.4	96.8	80.6
OECD 25	2000	90.7	103.2	104.5	112.8	111.9	86.7	79.8

Table 2: Relative incomes by age groups, ca. 2000¹⁹

Country	Time period	Age 0 - 17	Age 18 - 25	Age 26 - 40	Age 41 - 50	Age 51 - 65	Age 66 - 75	Age 76+
France	1984 - 1994	0.4	- 5.0	- 5.9	2.7	6.5	7.4	0.4
	1994 - 2000	- 1.5	1.6	- 0.3	- 3.0	5.1	- 5.2	4.0
Hungary	1991 - 1995	- 6.2	1.9	- 2.2	2.9	3.8	6.6	1.7
	1995 - 2000	- 0.6	- 1.8	3.5	- 9.9	6.4	- 5.0	3.8
Italy	1984 - 1995	- 3.4	- 2.2	- 1.3	0.9	3.5	5.7	5.4
	1995 - 2000	2.3	- 2.8	0.6	- 1.4	1.6	- 1.8	- 6.1
Sweden	1983 - 1995	- 2.2	- 10.7	- 4.7	0.8	7.7	5.8	8.8
	1995 - 2000	2.9	0.5	1.4	- 2.8	2.9	- 5.0	- 7.5
United States	1984 - 1995	2.5	- 5.1	- 1.8	0.7	3.1	- 0.3	- 2.4
	1995 - 2000	2.6	0.0	1.2	- 4.3	- 2.3	- 2.0	- 1.5
OECD 17	1985 - 1995	- 0.1	- 5.7	- 1.3	2.6	2.7	2.4	0.0
	1995 - 2000	0.5	- 1.3	1.0	- 3.7	1.6	- 1.0	- 0.3

Table 3: Changes in relative incomes by age groups, ca. 1984-2000

Country	Year	Age								Total
		0 - 17	18 - 25	26 - 40	41 - 50	51 - 65	66 - 75	76+		
Australia	1999	11.6	5.6	8.0	8.6	14.0	20.6	28.8	11.2	
France	2000	7.3	7.6	5.6	5.2	6.6	9.9	11.3	7.0	
Germany	2001	10.9	13.7	8.4	4.1	7.9	9.7	10.7	8.9	
Hungary	2000	13.1	7.1	7.5	8.2	7.2	5.5	4.8	8.1	
Italy	2000	15.7	14.0	11.0	11.7	10.7	14.6	16.4	12.9	
Japan	2000	14.3	16.6	12.4	11.7	14.4	19.5	23.8	15.3	
Sweden	2000	3.6	14.4	4.9	2.8	2.4	4.6	11.5	5.3	
Switzerland	2001	6.8	5.5	5.9	3.7	7.6	10.4	12.7	6.7	
United Kingdom	2000	16.2	11.9	8.7	7.9	7.6	11.4	19.2	11.4	
United States	2000	21.7	19.1	13.8	11.0	13.0	20.3	29.6	17.1	
OECD 24	2000	12.3	11.5	8.7	7.5	8.9	11.4	16.5	10.4	

Table 4: Relative poverty rates by age groups, ca. 2000

Country	Time period	Age								Total
		0 - 17	18 - 25	26 - 40	41 - 50	51 - 65	66 - 75	76+		
France	1994 - 2000	0.2	- 0.7	- 0.4	- 0.7	- 1.2	1.5	- 3.5	- 0.4	
Hungary	1995 - 2000	2.8	0.0	0.8	2.2	2.2	- 0.2	- 6.2	0.8	
Italy	1995 - 2000	- 2.9	0.4	- 3.1	1.2	- 1.2	- 0.1	0.2	- 1.3	
Sweden	1995 - 2000	1.1	2.0	1.5	0.6	0.4	2.2	6.2	1.6	
United States	1995 - 2000	- 0.6	0.2	0.1	0.8	0.0	3.4	4.0	0.4	
OECD 24	1995 - 2000	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.1	- 0.2	0.5	

Table 5: Changes in relative poverty rates by age groups, ca. 1995-2000

How do the different generations fare in terms of economic well-being? The best comparative overview over the income positions of age groups or cohorts is available in an OECD paper by Michael Förster and Marco Mira D'Ercole.¹⁸ It contains unified data for the beginning of this century for different countries, some of which are selected for table 2. The relative disposable incomes are equalised, i.e., individual incomes are adjusted for household size. 100 is the average for the population over all ages. The children and partly, but not always, the young aged 18 to 25 are below this average as well as the elderly.

A precise differentiation between life course (age) and generational (cohort) effects would require data over time for corresponding age groups. A first approximation is given by table 3.²⁰ In France, as an example, the age group from 18 to 25 has clearly lost in the decade from 1984 to 1994 and then has made up some of it again. Other countries have gone through a different evolution. In Italy, for instance, this age group has lost in both periods, and this is also the composite pattern for all 17 OECD countries for which such data are available.

Overall, there has been stability in the relative income of children and adolescents (those aged 1 to 17) in the decade from 1985 to 1995 and a slight increase in the half decade from the mid-1990s to 2000. Young adults have lost ground over both periods, which may be the result of the expansion of higher education, in other words, the later transition into the labour force. Children have lower relative equivalent disposable incomes than the active population, whereas for young adults the picture is uneven. In most countries incomes peak in middle adulthood and then decrease again. The elderly fare worse than the active population, and also somewhat worse than children; the U.S., as well as Switzerland, is again an outlier in this respect. The 'old olds' (75+) have especially low incomes, considerably lower than those of the 'young old' (65-74). The incomes of the elderly grew from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s due to the expansion of old-age security; this trend was however reversed after the mid-1990s.²¹

A different assessment of the economic well-being of the age groups and cohorts is given by the poverty rates, measured here as the proportion below 50 percent of the median equivalent income. Overall, the rate at the beginning of this century amounted to 10.4 percent in the OECD 24. In the liberal countries – Australia, the UK and the U.S. – both children and the elderly have much higher poverty rates than the population at working age. This is not the case in most other countries. 17 percent of the population of the U.S. live in relative poverty compared to five percent of the

Swedish population. This clearly shows that welfare states make a difference (cf. table 4 and 5).²²

The welfare state has succeeded in smoothing life time consumption chances, and thus in keeping economic cleavages between generations at bay. The stylised picture presented above shows a massive variation of relative poverty rates among nations, and especially between the two welfare regimes at opposite ends, the 'liberal' (Anglo-Saxon) versus the 'social-democratic' (Scandinavian) regime. Children and the elderly fare worse than the active population in the liberal regime but not in the social-democratic regime. The other two regimes – the 'conservative' regime of continental Western Europe and the 'familistic' regime of the Mediterranean – are situated somewhere in between. As an example of the latter, Italy does not have a 'residual' welfare state but a welfare state which is focused on the male breadwinners. In spite of some recent changes, pension levels for these male breadwinners are still very high. In a longer overall perspective, poverty has remained stable or increased among children. It decreased among the elderly after the 1970s but this trend stopped in the mid-1990s; one can already detect some effects of recent pension 'reforms' – or rather retrenchments.²³ The fairly even distribution of economic resources is now threatened both by the primary distribution of income on the labour market and by its redistribution through the welfare state. Increasing labour market inequalities as well as welfare state retrenchment may deepen economic cleavages. In policy terms, it is necessary to target support for children (and their parents) but there is no reason to strip the elderly of their benefits considering how they fare compared to the total population.

Democracy is a device that ensures we shall be governed no better than we deserve.

/ George Bernard Shaw /

Moving towards gerontocracy?

Age differences in party voting are absent in the U.S. and counterintuitive in Germany, if one assumes that older people should support the party most in favour of the welfare state, i.e., the Social Democrats. Through the pension reform of 1957, the CDU succeeded in capturing the agenda of welfare. This has translated into higher vote shares for the CDU/CSU among the elderly than among other parts of the population. Although the Left Party currently profits from protest votes mainly by the elderly, age effects have favoured the CDU/CSU, which in Federal elections has always been above the mean for the 60+.




Figure 1: Old-age conservatism? Party vote shares in German federal elections (share among 60+ as a percentage of total vote share)²⁴

The elderly have an increasing weight in public voting not only because of their increasing demographic share, but also because they have a higher participation in elections than the young.²⁵ A similar pattern emerges for party membership. The ageing of party members and party elites is uneven. The Greens are basically a one-generation party which has aged with its generation. Their elites are now between 40 and 50 years old. The PDS has been mostly a party of retirees, but since the formation of the Left Party there has been some infusion of younger members as well. All parties except the Greens are faced with a higher membership among retirees than among the active population.

But party membership does not necessarily translate into power. In the German case – unlike apparently in France²⁶ – there exists a paradox of representation: The elderly have a much lower representation in parliament and government than their population share, and since the 1960s the mean age of the members of the *Bundestag* has even decreased somewhat. Non-traditional participation is also low but to some extent growing, and we may assume that these new forms of old-age activism will gain in importance with the aging of the 68ers.

Some proponents of 'generational equity' argue that the window of opportunity for implementing reforms of the welfare state is closing because the older population increasingly dominates the political arena by its sheer voting weight. They see a point of no return when the power of the elderly will be such that they will be able to block any attempt at reducing their benefits. In a model for Germany, Hans-Jürgen Sinn and Silke Uebelmesser²⁷ took into account both demography and age-specific voting participation, and made a projection of the median age of voters and of the 'indifference age' where one is affected neither positively nor negatively by a pension reform. Above

this threshold people are more likely to profit from improvements in old-age security, below it they are more likely to have a negative payoff with the costs outweighing the benefits. The assumption is that reform will be feasible only if the median voter favours it. The authors conclude that until 2016 a reform can be democratically enforced because a majority of the voters will still be below the indifference age. 2016 is 'Germany's last chance'; after that year it will be a gerontocracy, with no possibility of cutting old-age benefits anymore because the majority will vote for them. Such a model of self-interest is of course highly flawed; it presupposes that people's votes are based only on their current individual interest position and that voting shares fully translate into specific policies – both of which is manifestly not the case.²⁸ There is among the elderly an interest in the following generations, in one's own family but also on a societal level, and thus possibly an even stronger tendency for group-oriented ('socio-tropic') voting than among the general population. A simple rational choice model which assumes that voters maximise their own perceived current interests does not provide a valid account of the act of voting.

Parties and unions as mediating organizations

Why are age conflicts not more pronounced? One reason – at least in the corporatist pattern of Germany – is the mediating function of political organisations such as parties and unions.²⁹ These organisations have created special groups for the elderly, just as for other hitherto neglected categories such as women and the young. They have set up these groups as a form of internalised interest groups that mobilise these categories for the goals of the overarching organisation. Another advantage of such groups is that they offer further possibilities of participation for political cadres beyond the main organisational hierarchies. Those who, e.g., leave the *Bundestag* and have to hand over their mandates to younger colleagues can then take over functions in the *Senioren-Union* or in

similar groups of other parties. The idea is to appropriate the demands of these population categories by giving them a special organisational niche, and thereby hoping that they will neither mobilise outside the party nor find their way into its core business. This is even more the case for unions, where the dilemma is heightened by the fact that unions' avowed purpose is directed to the working population. But unions also depend on their retired members for support and as a signal to their active members, and therefore offer them special groups for organising within the union but detached from its core business.³⁰ The shifting generational agenda is mirrored by the weight of these groups. In the CDU/CSU, for example, the past years have seen a shift from privileging the young to aiming for a balance between the generations. In the build-up for the coming election, the heads of the *Junge Union* and *Senioren-Union* have therefore been called upon to cooperate on an agenda of generational integration. Special groups are successful to the extent that age conflicts remain within the organisational reach of the parties and do not manifest themselves on the open political market. The exception are the grey parties, which have had some electoral success in some countries, especially in the Netherlands. But as with most one-issue parties, they have usually not lasted because either other parties took up their issue or because they self-destructed over their own internal issue divisions. The only successful one-issue party in Germany so far have been the Greens, and they were successful by broadening their agenda.

Family relations

Another reason for the low salience of age conflicts is family relations and inter-family transfers. Families are the prototypical institutions of age integration. An example is given by Uhlenberg's analysis of data from the U.S. General Social Survey that asked adult respondents to identify up to 5 other adults with whom they had discussed important matters over the past six months. The result was very clear: the discussion partners were either age peers or family members. No one under age 30 identified any non-kin over 70 as a discussion partner, and vice-versa. In other words, no members of other generations and ages were mentioned except within the family. The importance of the family for age integration is corroborated by data on residential patterns and support. While household co-residence of adult family generations in Western Europe today has become rare, except for some Mediterranean countries, geographical proximity is high. The same applies to emotional closeness and to social and financial support. The other side of the coin is a surprisingly low prevalence of intergenera-

tional family conflicts. In Germany these issues were first studied through the *German Aging Survey (Alters-Survey)*³¹, and at the European level through the *Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)*³². Elderly parents are net givers in terms of *inter vivos* financial transfers; their net contribution to their descendants in Germany in 1996 amounted to nine percent of the yearly pension sum. Volunteering and family support activities of the elderly made up another 21 percent.³³ Parental altruism in terms of an orientation towards the special needs of their children is strong, even though there may also be expectations of reciprocity.³⁴ Inheritance is another major and substantive concern of the elderly, as even those with modest means usually want to leave something to their children. There is a systematic difference between the generations here: parents have a stake in continuation by transferring their social, material and cultural capital to their children, while children have a stake in becoming autonomous. Both family sociology and evolutionary theory concur on this.³⁵ It is often argued that this is a recent development. In the family of the 19th century, before the full onset of industrialisation – so the ar-

Other things may change us, but we start and end with family.

/ Anthony Brandt /

gument goes – the elderly were supported by their children, and children were seen as an insurance for old age. But this is less evident than it seems at first sight. A revisionist social history of generations now claims that parents have always given more to their children than vice-versa.³⁶

Figure 2 shows the variation among welfare regimes in the amounts of intergenerational support. This balance of giving and receiving combines financial transfers and social support; each hour of social support has been calculated with a wage rate of 7.50€. The overall pic-




Figure 2: Balance of financial transfers and social support among adult family generations by age group and regime³⁷

Data source: SHARE 2004 release 1, own calculations

ture confirms the evidence presented so far: Up to age 80 people are net givers, whereas after this age they become net recipients, at least in Central and Southern Europe.

Generation and class: cleavages and integration

In Western societies, social stratification in terms of labour incomes and welfare (transfer) incomes is historically increasing. The aging of the population is likely to deepen class inequalities because important dimensions of the life course such as morbidity and mortality, functional capacity, pension income, as well as social participation and embeddedness are socially stratified. Inter-individual variation is to a considerable extent socially stratified variation, and it increases with age: the class divide matters more in old age than at any other time of life. The historically increasing stratification also increases inequalities within age groups. This historical (period) effect interacts with the age effect with regard to the lifetime accumulation of benefits and deficits, vulnerability and resilience. But while class cleavages deepen, class mobilisation seems to fade away. Class mobilisation is still institutionalised in the systems of industrial relations as well as in most party systems. However, industrial relations are nowadays characterised by weakening union power and weakening corporatist arrangements. Stable party attachments as well as traditional left-right cleavages are also weakening.

As generations, current structural trends – demographic discontinuity, economic insecurity and welfare state retrenchment – lead to a high and increasing salience of generational cleavages, which offer a considerable potential for generational mobilisation. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a gerontocracy is low and support for the public generational contract is still broad among all age groups. The age-integrative effects of family solidarity are strong, and political organisations play a key mediating role. However, the increasing salience of class cleavages may change this picture. The salience of class is especially high among the elderly and also among the young, i.e., among the more vulnerable parts of the population. This interaction of class and age or generation may create new lines of mobilisation as new cohorts grow up and enter old age.

Notes:

1. Kohli 1987.
2. Bengtson 1993; Kaufmann 2005.
3. Albertini / Kohli / Vogel 2007: 319.
4. Kohli 2006: 1.
5. Hernes 1987; Mirowsky / Ross 1999; Esping-Andersen / Sarasa 2002.
6. Kohli 2006: 1.
7. Kohli 2006: 13.

8. Kohli 2007.
9. Kohli 2006: 3.
10. Daniels 1988.
11. Esping-Andersen Kühnemund / Motel / Szydlik 2002; Esping-Andersen / Sarasa 2002; Preston 1984b.
12. Kohli 2006: 3.
13. Kohli 2006: 9.
14. Scherger / Kohli 2005.
15. Kohli et al. 2000.
16. Thomson 1989.
17. Kohli 2006: 13.
18. Förster / Mira D'Ercole 2005.
19. Source for Tables 2-5: Förster/Mira d'Ercole 2005.
20. Förster / Mira D'Ercole 2005.
21. Förster / Mira D'Ercole 2005.
22. Förster / Mira D'Ercole 2005.
23. Liebig / Lengfeld / Mau 2004.
24. Kohli / Neckel / Wolf 1999.
25. Binstock 2000.
26. Louis Chauvel's text in this issue.
27. Sinn / Uebelmesser 2002: 155.
28. Kohli 2006: 12.
29. Kohli / Neckel / Wolf 1999.
30. Wolf / Kohli / Künemund 1994.
31. Kohli 1999; Kohli / Künemund 2005.
32. E.g. Albertini / Kohli / Vogel 2007.
33. Kohli 1999.
34. Kohli 2006: 18.
35. Giarrusso / Bengtson / Stallings 1994; Low 1998.
36. E.g. Ehmer 2000 (Austrian Science Fund, FWF), Belgium (through the Belgian Science Policy Office) and Switzerland (through BBW/OFES/UFES) was nationally funded. The SHARE data set is introduced in Börsch-Supan et al. 2005; methodological details are reported in Börsch-Supan / Jürges 2005.
37. from Kohli et al. 2007.

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